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This  paper  reviews  the  negotiation  of  an  Interim  Economic 
Partnership Agreement for the Pacific group of the ACP (PACP). It  
begins  with  a  summary  of  the existing trade agreements  of  the 
PACPs with their major trading partners, and considers the relative 
importance of their trade with the EU. It then reviews the various 
impact  assessments  which  have  been  undertaken  to  inform the 
PACPs’ negotiations of an EPA, before turning to consideration of 
the  progress  of  the  negotiations  themselves,  identifying  those 
issues  which  were  to  prove  most  problematic.  It  concludes  by 
outlining the Interim Agreement, which was only signed by Fiji and 
PNG, and assessing the likely prospects of a Final Agreement being 
achieved by the end of 2008.
As a result of successful challenges within the WTO to the existing 
trade  concessions  offered  to  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
(ACP) group of developing countries under the Lomé Conventions, 
the successor Cotonou Agreement, signed in 2000, provided for the 
renegotiation  of  these  concessions  by  January  2008,  when  the 
current  WTO  waiver  expires.  The  new  Economic  Partnership 
Agreements (EPA) was to be negotiated with regional groupings of 
the ACP states.  Although the EU committed itself  to introducing 
trade agreements that would not worsen the position of the ACP 
states1 it  also  required  that  the  new  EPAs  should  be  WTO-
compatible.  While  non-reciprocal  trade  concessions  have  been 
offered  to  the  low  income  developing  countries  under  the 
1 “a framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation” (Article 
37.6)
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‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) initiative since 20012, the ACP group 
includes both low-income and middle-income developing countries. 
WTO  compatibility  therefore  requires  the  replacement  of  the 
existing non-reciprocal Lomé trade concessions with a reciprocal 
agreement. 
The interpretation of WTO compatibility has been one of the 
major  sources  of  disagreement  in  the  subsequent  negotiations. 
Under  Article  24  of  the  WTO  any  agreement  must  cover 
“substantially all trade” between the signatories of a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA). Some have interpreted this as referring to the 
value  of  trade  between  the  members  of  the  FTA,  while  others 
suggest  the  requirement  refers  to  the  coverage  of  tariff  lines. 
‘Substantial’ is also ambiguous, but a minimum figure of 80% of 
trade between the parties in the previous three years is generally 
accepted, although any agreement is subject to challenge by other 
WTO members. There is also the possibility of asymmetric coverage 
in order to achieve the minimum coverage requirement – i.e.100 % 
of EU imports, 70% of ACP imports. The issue of the “substantially 
all trade” requirement is particularly important for the Pacific ACP 
States (PACP) since the value of their imports from the evening EU 
is small and the commodity composition highly variable from year 
to year. Only case law would provide a clearer indication of this 
interpretation of Article 24’s “substantially all trade” requirement. 
Article 24 also allows for an interim agreement leading to the 
formation  of  an  FTA,  but  this  should  take  place  “within  a 
reasonable  period  of  time”.  The  Understanding  on  the 
Interpretation of Article 24 signed at the end of the Uruguay Round 
suggests that such interim agreements should not exceed ten years 
except in “exceptional cases”. There is also the issue of whether 
the phasing out of trade barriers is ‘front’ or ‘back-loaded’ during 
the  transition  period  and  whether  such  phasing  should  be 
2 Of the 14 Pacific ACP states Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu are low income developing countries and will qualify for the EBA.
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asymmetrical.  As  we  shall  see  this  is  a  significant  issue  in  the 
implementation of EPAs.
Under Article 37.7 in 2004 a review of the negations was to 
take place, at which time alternative trade arrangements could be 
considered.  From  the  beginning  of  the  negotiations  the  main 
alternative  to  the  adoption  of  the  EPA  has  been  seen  as  some 
variant upon the existing Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
The  EU’s  GSP,  like  that  granted  by  other  developed  countries, 
offers non-reciprocal preferential rates of duty for imports from all 
developing countries.  As the GSP does not discriminate between 
developing  countries  it  is  WTO  compatible.  The  preferences, 
expressed as a percentage of MFN duties, ranges from 15% for the 
most sensitive products to 100% for non-sensitive items. In 2006 
the current GSP was introduced, covering 7,200 products from 179 
countries.  In  addition ‘GSP plus’  was  offered to  ‘dependent  and 
vulnerable’  countries.  To qualify for these additional concessions 
countries  must  ratify  23  international  conventions  (e.g.  human 
rights,  labour  standards,  etc.)  and  demonstrate  economic 
dependence3, requirements so far met by fifteen countries. While 
the EBA, which provides duty-free access for all EU imports from 
low  income  developing  countries,  is  superior  to  the  existing 
Cotonou Agreement, the latter provides similar duty-free access for 
94% of all ACP exported to the EU. However access under Cotonou 
is significantly superior to the existing EU GSP scheme and any 
enhanced GSP scheme could not discriminate between developing 
countries if it is to be WTO compatible.
Cotonou’s Sugar Protocol has been particularly significant for 
Fiji.  95% of  the value of  its  €100 m.  exports  to the EU is  from 
sugar,  26%  of  its  total  export  earnings.  The  Sugar  Protocol 
committed the EU to importing 165,348 tonnes of sugar from Fiji at 
EU  internal  guaranteed  prices.   In  addition  an  Agreement  on 
3 Dependence is defined as the 5 largest sectors of GSP exports accounting for 
75% of total GSP EU exports and being less than 1% of total EU imports under 
the GSP.
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Special  Preferential  Sugar  (SPS)  provides  for  additional  imports 
from the  ACP  and  India  based  upon  predicted  shortfalls  in  the 
maximum needs of the EU’s sugarcane refineries.  The price of SPS 
sugar is 85% of the CAP guaranteed minimum price. Fiji has been 
allocated 30,000 tonnes (9.3%) under the SPS. The Sugar Protocol 
has a legal status independent of the Cotonou Agreement but as it 
is only available to 18 ACP states it remained open to challenge in 
the WTO. Thus in July 2007 the EU finally denounced the Protocol, 
with it being phased out by October 2009. It has been estimated 
that this will cost Fiji €20.9 m. over the phasing out period (South 
Centre 2007). At the same time from 2006 to 2009 the ‘Everything-
But-Arms’ trade agreement with low-income developing countries 
will provide for the phasing in of duty-free access for sugar.  These 
quotas will be counted against SPS allocations, slowly eroding Fiji’s 
allocation. The value of the Sugar Protocol is dependent upon the 
EU guaranteed price, which is also to be reduced by 36% by 2009, 
but the proposed abolition of EU export subsidies under the Doha 
round  may  raise  world  market  prices. Currently  Fiji’s  sugar 
preference is suspended as part of the EU sanctions following the 
military  coup,  but  Fiji  has  the  potential  to  establish  an 
internationally competitive sugar industry if structural reforms are 
successful.
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Existing Trade Agreements
Trade between the 14 members of the PACP4 Intra-PACP trade is 
very limited, representing only 2% of their total trade (1% 1995). 
Nonetheless the foundations have been laid the establishment of a 
FTA through the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). 
Created  in  2003 it  provides  for  trade  liberalisation  within  eight 
years, although sensitive industries would continue to be protected 
until  2016.  However  only  the Cook Islands,  Fiji  and Samoa had 
commenced  trading  under  PICTA  by  2007.  In  addition,  the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group of Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the 
Solomon  Islands  and  Vanuatu  committed  themselves  to  move 
towards trade liberalisation over an eight year period from 2005. 
Complementing these PACP arrangements is the 2003 Pacific Area 
Closer Economic Relations Agreement (PACER),  a  non-reciprocal 
trade agreement between the Pacific Forum island countries and 
Australia and New Zealand, the PACP’s major trading partners. A 
key  feature  of  PACER  is  the  creation  of  a  Regional  Trade 
Facilitation  Programme.  PACER  also  requires,  under  Article  6, 
negotiations to move towards an FTA agreement eight years after 
PACER comes into force or if the PACP’s adopt an FTA with a third 
party.  Such  negotiations  are  likely  to  be  triggered  by  any  EPA. 
Although PACER does not commit the PACP’s to the acceptance of 
any  subsequent  proposal,  there  was  acceptance  of  the  principle 
that  Australia  and New Zealand should not be disadvantaged in 
their  trade  with  the  PACP’s  relative  to  any  other  developed 
countries. Any meaningful assessment of the impact of an EPA upon 
the PACP’s must therefore take into account the extension of such 
trade concessions to Australia and New Zealand.
Further complications arise for the three PACP states (FSM, 
Palau, Marshall Islands) which have a Compact of Free Association 
4 Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (New Hebrides), Federated  States of 
Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati (Gilbert Isl.), Palau, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Cook 
Islands, Samoa, Tonga,Tuvalu (Ellice Isl.), Niue. 
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with  the  United  States.  Again  this  requires  that  the  US  should 
receive as favourable a market access as that provided to any other 
country.  Thus  any  EPA  assessment  must  take  into  account  the 
extension of duty-free access to US exports.
Only Fiji, PNG, the Solomons and Tonga are members of the 
WTO. This raises a problem for the EPA as the EU requires any 
final  agreement  to  be  WTO-compatible.  Thus  the EU suggestion 
that the EPA should employ the WTO dispute settlement procedure 
would raise serious problems for the non-WTO PACPs.
A further particular interest of the PACPs in the negotiations is 
the  position  of  the  French  Pacific  Territories  –  New  Caledonia, 
French Polynesia and Wallace and Fortuna. For some PACP states 
enhanced access to the high income territories of New Caledonia 
and French Polynesia is of greater potential significance than the 
metropolitan EU. While under Joint Declaration 27 of Cotonou the 
EU affirmed that any trade arrangements would apply to French 
Overseas  Departments  this  did  not  extend  to  French  overseas 
territories.
Article 41.4 of Cotonou envisages the “liberalisation of services 
in accordance with the provisions of  the GATS” under any EPA. 
However  this  extension  appears  to  be  viewed  as  a  later 
development  and  under  Article  41.3  requires  the  EU  “to  give 
sympathetic  consideration  to  the  ACP  states  priorities  for 
improvements  in the EC schedule,  with a  view to  meeting their 
specific interests”. 
EU Trade
In 2005 the EU15 exported goods to the value of €568 m. to the 
PACPs, a 79% increase on 2004/5, and imported goods to the value 
of €1,245 m. But the EU accounts for only 2% of total PACP imports 
and is a minor source of imports for individual PACPs. By contrast 
Australia (33% of total PACP imports), Singapore (20%) and New 
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Zealand  (13%)  account  for  between  50% and  80% of  individual 
PACP imports, with the exception of the US ‘Compact States’.
Similarly only Fiji (sugar 95% of the value of EU exports) and 
Papua New Guinea  (palm oil  31%,  coffee  27%,  tuna  10%)  have 
significant  exports  to  the  EU.  For  Fiji  the  Sugar  Protocol  is 
particularly important.  In an average year €50 m. of sugar was 
exported to the EU, at EU guaranteed prices, involving 35% - 40% 
of its total crop.  It also enjoys preferential margins for textile and 
tuna exports. Nonetheless there are particular exports from other 
countries which are heavily dependent on preferential access to the 
EU market. These include canned fish from the Solomon Islands, 
frozen fish and coconut products from Tonga and Vanuatu. Again 
exports from the PACP’s are dominated by Australia, New Zealand 
and the USA. Thus 20% of exports from the FSM (1999), 31% from 
Samoa (2001) and 26% from Fiji (2001) were to the USA. Australia 
accounted for 29% (2001) of exports from the Cook Islands, 27% 
from Fiji,  36% from PNG (1993) and 23% from Vanuatu (2001), 
while New Zealand absorbed 13% of Tonga’s exports. Japan is also 
a significant market for many of the PACP states.
Given the lack of significant manufacturing sectors, services 
are  of  particular  significance  to  many  PACP  states.  Tourism  is 
already important in Fiji,  the Cook Islands,  Samoa,  Vanuatu and 
Palau,  and  the  supply  of  seamen from Kiribati  and  Tuvalu.  The 
potential for the further development of the service sectors of the 
PACP  states  is  of  thus  of  particular  importance  in  the  EPA 
negotiations.
Although as we have seen for most of the PACP’s trade with 
the EU is relatively insignificant nonetheless it remains in surplus. 
The ratio of exports to the EU relative to imports is 8.9:1 for PNG, 
4.94:1 Fiji, 4.8:1 for the Solomon Islands and 2.7:1 for Kiribati. By 
contrast all  the PACP’s have bilateral  deficits  with Australia  and 
New Zealand, exceeding 10:1 for all  the PACP states except Fiji 
(3.2:1).
7
Impact Assessments
Economic
The  first  comprehensive  impact  assessment  of  an  EPA  for  the 
PACP’s  was  undertaken  by  Scollay  (2002).  While  principally  a 
qualitative assessment it nonetheless identified the principal issues 
of economic concern to the PACP’s in negotiating any EPA. In terms 
of  the  sectoral  impact  of  an  EPA  manufacturing  is  likely  to  be 
relatively unaffected. The manufacturing sector is only important in 
Fiji  and  PNG,  and  even  here  continued  protection  should  be 
possible  while  still  meeting  the  ‘substantially  all  trade’ 
requirement.  Again,  in  the  case  of  agricultural  production  for 
domestic consumption any EPA is unlikely to present difficulties as 
many food products already enter duty-free and local  fresh food 
production has a measure of natural protection against competing 
imports, given high transport costs. Thus the major interest for the 
PACP’s is the potential for improving their export performance in 
those products for which they may have a comparative advantage. 
These  products  include  tree  crops,  kava,  garments,  beef 
(Vanuatu) and fish. The fish industry has been identified as offering 
the greatest potential for future development with tuna canneries 
already  existing  in  Fiji,  the  Solomon  Islands  and  PNG.  Under 
Cotonou these tuna exports enjoy a 24% preference. While fresh 
fish is  exported to the USA and Japan the EU is  regarded as a 
potentially  important market  for intermediate  quality  fish.  Trade 
facilitation assistance is regarded as particularly important in the 
future  development  of  this  industry.  For  Fiji  sugar  exports  are 
particularly important,  however the future of the Sugar Protocol 
has been excluded from the EPA negotiations by the EU.
Of greater concern is the possible impact upon government 
revenues  of  any  reductions  in  import  duties.  Many PACP’s  have 
traditionally  relied  upon  import  duties  as  an  efficient  form  of 
revenue collection. The potential  revenue loss depends upon the 
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size  of  the  trade  flows  and  the  existing  tariff  rates.  Given  the 
relatively low level of imports from the EU any EPA would appear 
to have very little impact. However, as with any broader economic 
impact the central issue is the possibility of the extension of any 
FTA to Australia and New Zealand.
With  the  adoption  of  such  a  wider  FTA the  risks  of  trade 
diversion  and  the  likely  adjustment  costs  are  greater,  as  is  the 
impact upon the PACP’s government’s revenues. An earlier study 
by Stoeckel (1998) suggested that such an FTA with Australia and 
New Zealand would yield significant overall economic welfare gains 
to the PACP’s, although the affect upon the Compact States, with 
their significant trade with the USA, is less certain. However given 
the PACP’s significant imports from Australia and New Zealand the 
impact  upon  government  revenues  of  duty  reductions  presents 
more of  a challenge.  Tonga (import  duties  65% of  tax  revenue), 
Kiribati  (61%), Tuvalu (48%) and Vanuatu (40%) are particularly 
dependent upon tariff revenues. Three options offer themselves the 
PACP states – conversion of tariffs to excise duties, introduction of 
VAT or exclusion of products from the FTA. Samoa, PNG and the 
Cook Islands are already shifting the burden of taxation to VAT, 
while  Tonga  and  the  FSM are  considering  its  introduction.  For 
Vanuatu the conversion of tariffs to excise duties is an attractive 
strategy.
Within this  context  Scollay identified the major issues that 
would  need  to  be  addressed  if  the  PACP’s  were  to  realise  the 
development  potential  of  an  EPA.  Firstly  he  emphasises  the 
importance of the trade facilitation provisions. As we have seen the 
fish industry has been identified as offering the greatest potential, 
but to realise this will require assistance to meet EU phytosanitary 
requirements as well is the upgrading and expansion of production 
facilities.  Secondly,  satisfactory  ‘rules  of  origin’  (RoO)  must  be 
included in the EPA. The Cotonou agreement committed the EU to 
review its RoO (Article 37.7) as part of the EPA negotiations. Again 
9
RoO  are  particularly  important  for  fish  exports  and  it  was 
recognised  that  a  number  of  issues,  such  as  the  definition  of 
‘territorial  waters’,  remain  unresolved.  RoO  in  fisheries  are 
complicated  by  the  existence  of  bilateral  Fisheries  Agreements. 
Thirdly, the issue of ‘safeguard provisions’ must be addressed. The 
Cotonou Agreement  (Articles  8 & 9,  Annex V)  allows the EU to 
apply  ‘appropriate  measures’  where  the  volume  of  imports  may 
“cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic producers”. 
The Cotonou provisions are less circumscribed in their application 
than  those  in  the  WTO  Agreement  on  Safeguards  nor  do  they 
provide for reciprocal arrangements for the ACP states, who could 
argue, under the principle of ’special and differential treatment’, 
for  their  own  more  generous  safeguard  provisions.  Again  the 
significance  of  the  safeguard  provisions  under  an  EPA  would 
principally be of significance in setting a precedent for any FTA 
with Australia and New Zealand.
One of the further complications of an EPA for the PACP’s is 
that, unlike other regional ACP groupings, there is no immediate 
prospect  of  the  creation of  a  customs union.  Thus  although the 
negotiations have taken place on a collective regional basis,  the 
possibility of only a limited number of the PACP states subscribing 
to the EPA remained.  For example, for the five low-income PACP 
states the EBA provides non-reciprocal duty-free access to the EU 
market, and as it does not require reciprocal trade concessions will 
not  trigger  renegotiation  of  PACER.  But  Grynberg  and  Onguglo 
have suggested further flexibility could be introduced into a Pacific 
EPA,  to  accommodate  these  diverging  interests,  through  the 
adoption  of  ‘master’  and  ‘subsidiary’  agreements.  The  ‘master’ 
agreement  would  set  out  the  broad  principles  of  the  trade  and 
development relations between the PACP’s and the EU, offering the 
EU market access comparable to that enjoyed by other developed 
countries. The individual ‘subsidiary’ agreements, to which PACPs 
could chose to subscribe, would cover such areas as the trade in 
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goods, trade facilitation provisions, investment, services (including 
‘Mode  IV’  issues)  and  fisheries.  Scollay  found resistance  among 
some PACP states to the inclusion of fisheries agreement within any 
EPA negotiations. From an EU perspective the question arose as to 
whether there would be resistance to the adoption of such a ’pick 
and mix’ EPA, for although the PACPs are of little economic and 
political significance to the EU, any unconventional approach to the 
EPA  negotiations  might  have  set  a  precedent  for  other  more 
significant regional negotiations.
Scollay  concluded  by  supporting  a  three-stage  negotiating 
process; ACP wide level, regional level (addressing configuration, 
structure  of  EPA)  and  formal  regional  negotiations.  Assurances 
could  be  sought  to  ensure  that  PACER  negotiations  are  not 
triggered until the final stage. For the PACP’s the principal issues 
to be addressed in the formal negotiations were to include rules of 
origin,  safeguard  provisions,  trade  related  matters  (e.g. 
competition policy, phytosanitary requirements, labour standards, 
certification  etc.)  and  additionality  of  resources  (e.g.  trade 
facilitation).  The  PACP’s  would  also  need  to  develop  detailed 
proposals  in  regard  to  fisheries,  services  and  investment  and 
identify products for exemption. There were other issues which lay 
outside of the EPA negotiations but which determined their context 
and which Scollay argued the PACP’s would need to address. For 
Fiji the Sugar Protocol was of particular importance, while all the 
PACP states had a significant interest in any revision to WTO rules 
during  the  Doha  Round,  given  the  EPA  requirement  for  WTO 
compatibility.  Further,  in  anticipation  of  triggering  PACER 
renegotiation,  a  number  of  the  PACPs  would  need  to  develop 
alternative revenue strategies.
Adjustment Costs
The  most  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  potential  costs  of 
adjusting to an EPA for the PACPs was undertaken by Smith (2006). 
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This study refined the methodology adopted by Milner (2005) in his 
estimation of the overall ACP adjustment costs associated with an 
EPA. Milner defined five country size categories, the smallest being 
populations  under  1  million,  which  included  all  PACPs.  He  then 
identified  four  categories  of  economic  adjustment  costs  –  fiscal, 
trade  facilitation,  production  and  employment  and  skill 
development.  Fiscal  adjustment  and  trade  facilitation  were 
discussed  by  Scollay,  while  production  adjustment  and  skills 
development  would  impose  costs  through  support  for  the 
unemployed, retraining and restructuring of production lines and 
closures. His methodology involved categorising countries by the 
potential  degree  of  adjustment  necessary  under  these  four 
categories  and  then allocating  costs  based  upon 14 comparable 
World Bank projects; with costs interpolated for missing cells in the 
resulting matrix. His study did not address any costs arising from 
the need for macroeconomic adjustment, e.g. addressing a balance 
of payments deficit. 
The degree of potential fiscal adjustment was proxied by each 
country’s share of tariffs in total tax revenue. Only PNG (25% trade 
tax)  appears  in  his  analysis  as  requiring  medium adjustment;  a 
reflection  of  his  serious  data  limitations.  The  need  for  trade 
facilitation  assistance  is  proxied  by  the  share  of  manufactured 
exports in total  exports.  Fiji  (35%) is  classified as requiring low 
adjustment  while  the Solomon Islands (4%) and Tonga (4%) are 
included  in  the  high  adjustment  group.  The  share  of  industrial 
production in GDP is used by Milner as a measure of the likely need 
for employment support. Tonga (15%) incurs low adjustment, while 
Fiji (27%) falls in the medium category. Finally, skills development 
is  represented  by  secondary  school  enrolment  rates  as  a  crude 
indicator  of  human  capital;  the  lower  the  enrolment  rates  the 
greater the need for adjustment support. Vanuatu (28%) appears in 
the high adjustment category.  
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His  overall  ACP  estimates  totalled  €9  bn;  €3  n.  for  fiscal 
adjustment, €2.3 bn. for trade facilitation, €1.5 bn. for production 
and employment adjustment and €2.3 bn. for retraining. To provide 
a check of his estimates he also employed a ‘subsidy equivalent’ 
methodology which suggested  an overall  cost  of  €6  bn.  For  the 
PACP’s alone he suggests a total adjustment cost of € 642 m.; with 
a fiscal adjustment cost of €210 m., export diversification €175 m., 
employment/production adjustment €82 m. and skills/productivity 
€175 m. His PACP estimates exclude the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue 
and  Tuvalu,  while  data  limitations  have  compromised  the 
classification of the remaining PACPs under particular categories. 
Questions  also  remain  about  his  choice  of  proxies  and  the 
appropriateness  of  the  comparative  projects  underlying  his  cost 
estimates. In particular he assumes a high degree of non-linearity 
(diseconomies  of  scale)  in  adjustment  costs  i.e.  smaller  states 
incurring  significantly  higher  costs  than  larger  states.  This  is 
particularly important assumption in the case of the PACP’s who all 
fall in the micro state category. 
Smith (2006) re-estimated Milner’s study with additional and 
more recent data, including previously omitted countries, resulting 
in a total adjustment cost of €861 m. However Smith regarded the 
non-linearity as excessive and, based upon lower per capita cost 
assumptions  for  the  smaller  countries,  re-estimated  the  overall 
PACP  adjustment  costs  at  €430  m.  Smith  however  was  also 
concerned that Milner’s project comparators were mainly selected 
from larger countries which will be of little relevance to the PACP 
states.  He  therefore  revised  Milner’s  categorisation,  drew  upon 
more relevant PACP comparator projects and provided a separate 
estimate for service sector adjustment.
The PACP states were subdivided into four population sizes, 
while  fiscal  adjustment  was  now  proxied  by  trade  taxes  as  a 
percentage  of  total  revenue,  production  employment  by 
manufacturing  production  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  and  trade 
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facilitation by total goods exports as a percentage of GDP. His final 
category of skills development and productivity enhancement was 
subdivided,  with  the  latter  proxied  by  the  cost  of  enforcing 
contracts as assessed in the World Bank Cost of Doing Business 
Study  2005.  For  the remaining adjustment  costs  Smith followed 
Milner’s indicators. For the service sector estimates Smith further 
modified the proxy for production and employment adjustment to 
utilise data on non-governmental services as a percentage of GDP 
and for trade facilitation, tourism earnings as a percentage of GDP.
The  following  table  presents  Smith’s  estimates  of  the 
adjustment costs for all  the PACP’s  and totals  €170 m. incurred 
over  a  period  of  five  years.  Again  the  allowance  for  substantial 
fixed costs in the nonlinearity assumption may be excessive. If the 
smallest  category  of  PACP’s  is  excluded  them  total  adjustment 
costs fall to only €121 m. This is considerably less than Milner’s 
study and may be conservative given the need for some PACPs to 
adopt more export orientated economic policies. 
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From Smith (2006)
Smith  also  discusses  some  of  the  institutional  innovations 
that will be necessary to address the challenges of an EPA. The first 
aspect he addresses is the need for an enhancement of the national 
competition  authorities,  together  with  an  integrated  regional 
advisory  service;  estimated  to  cost  €15  m.  The  remaining  two 
initiatives would operate solely at the regional level. An Investment 
Protection  and  Promotion  Agreement  would  require  support, 
including the establishment of a regional office of the EU Centre 
for  the  Development  of  Enterprises  and  ProInvest,  technical 
assistance to support the Foreign Investment Advisory Service and 
the  strengthening  of  small  business  advisory  services5.  Smith 
estimates  an  additional  cost  of  €6.1  m.  Finally,  he  considers  a 
Human Resources Development Facility, in particular to facilitate a 
temporary  labour  mobility  scheme  (Mode  IV)6.  This  he  costs  at 
€7.5m.
Thus the overall estimate of the EPA adjustment costs for the 
PACP’s  totals  €184  m.  over  five  years.  This  contrasts  with  the 
existing  €79  m.  Regional  Indicative  Programme  for  the  PACP’s 
under EDF 10, covering the period to 2008. It is unlikely that the 
gap  in  funding  will  be  made  up  through  the  bilateral  National 
Indicative Programmes.  A further enhancement of approximately 
€100m.  in  EU aid  to  meet  the  needs  of  EPA adjustment,  would 
therefore  appear  to  be  justified.  To  manage  these  funds  Smith 
advocates  the  establishment  of  a  Pacific  Regional  Development 
Fund,  encompassing  a  Trade  Adjustment  Fund.  Given  the 
significance  of  any  renegotiation  of  PACER,  as  a  result  of  the 
establishment of an EPA, such a Regional Development Fund would 
provide  a  framework for  the  EU,  individual  EU Member  States, 
5 For a detailed discussion of investment protection and promotion se2 Hughes & 
Brewster (2002)
6 see Voight-Graf (2006)
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Australia and New Zealand, to support the necessary adjustment in 
the PACP’s. 
Political and Social Impact Assessments
Scollay  (2002)  offers a  brief  assessment  of  the  likely  social  and 
political  impact  of  an  EPA  upon  the  PACP’s.  As  the  largest 
economies, with substantial rural populations, Fiji and PNG would 
be most adversely affected by a failure to agree an EPA. For Fiji the 
future of the sugar industry is of prime importance, estimated to 
employ 100,000 people and accounting for 10% of GDP. However 
the Sugar Protocol will not form part of the EPA negotiations.  By 
contrast the future of PNG’s exports of tree crops, including palm 
oil, coffee, copra and cocoa, are heavily dependent upon continued 
EU market access. The impact of an EPA upon the PACP’s urban 
sectors  is  likely  to  be  limited,  but  the  extension  of  trade 
concessions to Australia and New Zealand under PACER is of far 
greater  significance.  The manufacturing sectors  of  both Fiji  and 
PNG would face  significant  adjustment  costs.  In  Fiji  the  loss  of 
preferential  access  and  enhanced  competition  from  other 
developing  countries  has  already  resulted  in  the  decline  of  the 
garment  industry.   In  PNG  the  extremely  high  rates  of  urban 
unemployment  would  make  any  structural  adjustment  socially 
destabilising.
For  the  other  PACPs  the  major  political  challenge  will  be 
changing  the  tax  base  and  moving  away  from  a  reliance  upon 
customs duties.   While  the Cook Islands,  Samoa and PNG have 
already  commenced  fiscal  reform,  Kiribati,  the  Marshall  Islands 
and Vanuatu had yet to overcome substantial opposition to change.
The Sustainability Impact Assessment
In 1999 the EC introduced Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) 
to inform its trade negotiations. These are intended to assess the 
economic,  social  and  environmental  impacts  of  EU trade  policy. 
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The  first  application  of  this  approach  were  the  negotiations 
undertaken under the Doha Round of the WTO, but subsequently 
PricewaterhouseCoopers  (PWC)  (2007)  were  contracted  to 
undertake an SIA of the EPA’s.
The  priority  sectors  for  study  within  the  EPA  negotiating 
configurations were selected in terms of their significance in trade 
flows,  those  that  were  likely  to  be  influenced  by  anticipated 
changes in the trade regime and where there was likely to be a 
potential  impact  upon  sustainability.  PWC  then  attempted  to 
estimate the likely impact of liberalisation of trade in goods and 
services,  in  comparison  with  the  current  state  of  regional 
integration and trade preferences, utilising a series of indicators.
In the case of the PACPs’ fish and fish products, especially 
tuna, were selected as the case study. Fish exports account for 7% 
of  the total  value  of  exports  of  the PACP’s  and are a  particular 
importance to Palau (90% exports), Cook Islands (50%), Vanuatu 
(50%) and Kiribati  (18.5%). Canned fish is also important in the 
exports of PNG, Fiji  and the Solomons. Half  of the world’s tuna 
fishery is located in the PACP’s Exclusive Economic Zones but 80% 
- 90% of the vessels involved in the industry are foreign owned. 
Only one-third of the catch is landed in the region, with 10% of 
revenues  retained  in  the  PACP’s  (Forum  Fisheries  Agency)  and 
several tuna species are already over exploited. However, the EU 
currently has limited involvement in this industry through Bilateral 
Fisheries Agreements with three PACP states. PWC selected three 
possible trade measures for impact assessment – market access, 
phytosanitary  requirements,  and  foreign  direct  investment.  The 
economic  impact  was  indicated  by  GDP,  government  revenues, 
investment,  and  impact  upon  small-scale  fisheries;  the  social 
impact by employment, wages, poverty, gender equality and food 
security;  the  environmental  impact  through  measures  of  fish 
stocks,  pollution  and marine  habitat.  The qualitative  assessment 
provided a  large number of  recommendations,  ranging from the 
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detailed, such as the development of a specific regional originating 
brand-name, to the general, such as the establishment of product 
standards,  the  development  of  strong  environmental  and  social 
protection and capacity-building for greater value-added in fishery 
products  through such measures  as  investment  protection.   The 
fisheries  component  of  an  EPA  should  be  compatible  with  the 
reformed  Common  Fisheries  Policy  through  the  adoption  of  a 
Regional Fisheries Agreement. In particular PWC recommended a 
lump  sum  payment  for  EU  vessel  access  to  a  regional  body 
responsible  for  the  promotion  of  a  sustainable  fishery  through 
improved monitoring and enforcement, and economic development 
of the industry through such mechanisms as compulsory landing. 
However it failed to discuss the important issue of Rules of Origin 
which currently inhibit PACP fish product exports to the EU caught 
by non-EU foreign-owned vessels.7
Any SIA presents a challenge in terms of adequate data and 
robust  theoretical  models  that  identify  the  causal  relationship 
between  economic,  social  and  environment  impacts  and  in 
identifying the adjustment process to a new equilibrium. However 
this study left even many broader questions unanswered, such as 
the  selection  of  the  base  and  alternative  scenarios  or  even  the 
selection of  the fishing industry itself.  Some critics  have viewed 
this selection more as a reflection of EU economic interests than 
PACP priorities in any EPA8. Indeed the question of the ‘ownership’ 
and purpose of the SIA process itself has been raised. The PWC 
study even offered relatively little detailed analysis of the fisheries 
sector and mainly drew upon existing work. But most importantly it 
failed to address the likely impact of any EPA upon the far more 
economically  significant  PACER  trade  agreement  with  Australia 
and New Zealand. Thus unsurprisingly we find that this SIA made 
little contribution to the wider Pacific EPA negotiations.
7 For a detailed discussion of the issues involved in a Fisheries Agreement 
between the EU and PACPs see Oxfam New Zealand (2006a).
8 For a critique of the Pacific EPA SIA see Dearden (2005)
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The Negotiations
The Joint Roadmap
The  first  phase  of  the  EPA  negotiations  were  launched  in 
September 2000 at the ACP level and concluded in October 2003, 
with the commencement of PACP EPA negotiations in September 
2004. The agreed Joint Road Map (EC 2004) gives some indication 
of the EC’s thinking. It emphasised the objective of the integration 
of the PACPs into the world economy, with sustainable development 
and poverty eradication. To achieve these objectives “the EC EPA 
must  be  an  instrument  for  development  and  the  development 
dimension  reflected  in  all  areas  of  negotiations.”  The  EC  also 
places particular emphasis upon the contribution that an EPA can 
make to further the process of regional integration. Thus the pace 
of liberalisation of trade under the EPA will be “a function of the 
degree of regional economic integration and realised in a flexible 
and asymmetrical manner”.
It specifically recognises the need for special and differential 
treatment for all PACPs to take account of their differing needs and 
levels of development. Such differential treatment is not “limited 
only  to  longer  transitional  periods  and  technical  assistance 
(para.14)”  and  “may  go  beyond  existing  WTO  measures”. 
“Flexibility will be built into the broadly agreed framework to allow 
individual  countries  to  adjust  the  pattern  and  schedules  of 
implementation”.  The  PIF  proposal  for  a  master/subsidiary 
structure of an EPA thus appeared to be accepted in principle.
 However  it  reaffirms  the  requirement  that  the  EPA  be 
“compatible with WTO rules then prevailing (para. 18).” But it also 
commits the EU to working with the PACPs to identify and further 
their common interests in the ongoing Doha Round negotiations, 
which may change these WTO requirements, particularly in regard 
to the issues of the definition of ‘substantially all trade’ and ‘special 
and  differential  treatment’  for  the  developing  countries.  The 
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implications of the EPA for PACER and that of  the US ‘compact 
states’, is specifically acknowledged in the Joint Road Map and ‘will 
need to be reflected in all areas of negotiations” (par. 17). While 
acknowledging  that  adopting  an  EPA  will  require  significant 
economic adjustment by the PACP’s, no clear commitment is made 
by the EC to the provision of additional financial resources other 
than reference to the existing aid support mechanisms such as the 
EDF.
The structure of the negotiations was to follow the normal 
pattern with a Ministerial-level Regional Negotiating Team (RNT) 
supported by Negotiating Groups (NG) addressing specific issues. 
Each NG was led by a senior Pacific trade official and composed of 
senior  officials  and  technical  experts,  supported  by  the  Pacific 
Islands  Forum  Secretariat.  A  Regional  Preparatory  Task  Force 
(RPTF) was also expected to be created to support the negotiation 
and implementation of the EPA and to address the link between the 
EPA  and  development  cooperation.   The  National  and  Regional 
Authorising officers for EDF funding were intended to be members 
of  the  RPTF,  together  with  EC  representatives  of  DG  Dev, 
EuropeAid  and  DG  Trade.  By  contrast  in  the  RNT  the  EC  was 
represented by the Commissioner for Trade and in the NGs by DG 
Trade  officials.  It  was  anticipated  that  substantive  negotiations 
would be completed by the end of 2006 with a final draft completed 
by  mid  2007,  leaving  sufficient  time  for  consultation  with  other 
relevant stakeholders.
PACP 2006 Proposals
In June 2006 the PACPs presented their draft EPA text to the EC9. It 
proposed the framework and subsidiary agreement structure that 
had been outlined by  Scollay,  despite  the EC’s  preference for  a 
unified EPA. The framework or master agreement covers only the 
broad  principles  and  does  not  involve  any  commitment  to 
9 For a critical review see Oxfam 2006c
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reciprocal  free  trade.  However  it  does  include  services  and 
investment in the framework as advocated by the EU. It proposes a 
separate agreement covering Trade in Goods but does not address 
the  issue  of  the  definition  of  “substantially  all  trade”  nor  the 
phasing of the tariff  reductions. However it does focus upon the 
issue of Rules of Origin (RoO), advocating the use of the change in 
tariff heading at the six digit level as the criteria. This would mean 
that any fish caught within the PACPs EEZ would qualify for duty-
free  free  access  to  the  EU.   The  Draft  also  proposes  a  non- 
reciprocal prohibition on the use of anti-dumping measures by the 
EU against Pacific exports, together with provisions for temporary 
tariff protection by the PACP’s where there is a threat of damage to 
domestic  industry  or  to  support  the  development  of  an  ‘infant’ 
industry. It also attempted to address the issue of an alternative to 
an EPA which would still meet the guarantees offered to the ACPs 
under  Cotonou  (Article  37.6)  by  suggesting  compensatory 
payments10. At this stage only PNG, Vanuatu, the Solomons and Fiji 
had  indicated  their  willingness  to  negotiate  a  Trade  in  Goods 
agreement. 
Under Chapter 4 the Draft proposes a trade facilitation and 
promotion programme for each PACP and financial assistance for 
the private sector. Similarly for the agricultural sector the PACP’s 
proposed  the  establishment  of  a  specific  fund  to  support  an 
Agricultural Development Strategy. However as we will see the EU 
was to resist additional funding beyond that provided EDF 10. The 
Draft also called for measures to address the restructuring of the 
sugar industry, principally of concern to Fiji, the establishment of a 
Regional Fisheries Agreement and the restoration of a mechanism 
similar  to the abandoned STABEX to  compensate  for  commodity 
price fluctuations. 
While the EU had made it clear that it is seeking agreements 
on services closely modelled upon the WTO’s General Agreement 
10 For a discussion of a Pacific attitude to alternatives to the EPA see Oxfam
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on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS),  the  PACPs  sought  to  introduce  a 
number  of  safeguards.  These  included  a  clear  statement  of  the 
rights of governments to regulate in the public  interest  and the 
right  to  delay  implementing  liberalisation  until  an  appropriate 
regulatory regime is in place. Further they sought exemption from 
privatisation for public services such as health care, education and 
water supply. Labour mobility was included as part of the services 
chapter but applied only to the movement of skilled workers.  As 
this  involved  the  politically  sensitive  area  of  Member  States’ 
immigration policies the EU was reluctant to negotiate a collective 
agreement with the PACP’s in this area.
In terms of the investment dimension the PACP’s proposed 
re-orientating the European Investment Bank,  ProInvest  and the 
Centre  for  the  Development  of  Enterprise  towards  the needs  of 
small and medium-sized enterprises. The PACP’s also advocated a 
model for investment that limited portfolio investment, safeguarded 
preferences for local companies, required environmental and social 
impact assessments and transparency in the terms and operation of 
foreign investment.
The EC response was mixed11. While welcoming the proposed 
EPA structure, with an Annex on the trade in goods to be adopted 
by  interested  PACP’s,  it  rejected  a  number  of  other  important 
elements  in the Draft.  The EC again refused calls  for additional 
funding specifically linked to the EPA to assist with any necessary 
structural adjustment. While expressing their willingness to include 
transition periods and other bilateral safeguards, they emphasised 
the long run positive benefits of liberalising trade. The EC regarded 
the  EDF as  the  appropriate  mechanism for  linking  development 
assistance to  the EPA,  and expressed concern that  the Regional 
Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) had not been created. They argued 
that the lack of an RPTF had seriously inhibited the PACPs’ input 
into the programming discussions for EDF 10. However the PACPs 
11 see Letter from Karl Falkenberg 20 th October 2006 (12520).
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had chosen not to initiate the RPTF specifically to emphasise the 
need for  separate funding for any EPA adjustment,  arguing that 
without such additional funding the RPTF had little purpose. 
The  call  for  a  separate  Regional  Fisheries  Agreement  was 
also dismissed, the EC arguing that the important elements could 
be integrated into the EPA.  Critics however questioned whether an 
EPA will be able to address important issues such as local landing 
provisions,  regulating  by-catches  and  the  local  crewing 
requirements12. 
In regard to the PACPs safeguard proposals for the liberalisation of 
the service sector the EC appeared to be maintaining its hostility to 
any ACP concessions, as reflected in a November 2006 submission 
to  the  133  Committee  that  coordinates  trade  negotiations.  For 
example,  it  introduces  a  necessity  test  for  a  universal  service 
obligation service in posts and telecommunications.  Despite a WTO 
agreement  on  services  that  calls  for  flexibility  in  relation  to 
developing countries and commitments to ‘special and differential 
treatment’ under Cotonou, the EC appeared to be firmly committed 
to its call for reciprocal liberalisation of trade in services. The EC’s 
response to the request for enhanced rights of entry of unskilled 
workers into the Member States was specifically rejected as this 
lay  beyond  the  competence  of  the  EC.  As  for  the  investment 
proposals the EC emphasises that it will not be able to “redefine 
what we have already jointly agreed in Cotonou”; the introduction 
of  general  principles  for  the  protection  and  promotion  of 
investment. The EC was more positive in its response to proposals 
on Rules of Origin, an issue that was still under internal discussion. 
Although the EC recommitted itself to achieving the greatest 
possible market  access for Pacific EPA countries and recognised 
the  need  to  address  the  problem of  sensitive  products  amongst 
PACP imports, it nonetheless expressed concern that a number of 
major  issues  remain  to  be  addressed,  including  government 
12 See Oxfam 2006b
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procurement,  competition policy and intellectual  property rights, 
“partly already agreed in the Cotonou Agreement”; the ‘Singapore 
issues’  previously  rejected  by  developing  countries  in  the  WTO 
Millennium Round negotiations.  “The submitted draft EPA text will 
have  to  undergo  substantial  amendment  before  it  can  become 
mutually agreeable EPA.” As for addressing the possibility of  an 
alternative to an EPA, this did not appear to be on the EU’s agenda. 
The EC also pressed for an acceleration of the negotiating 
process to achieve the 2008 deadline. But Kalipate Tavola, outgoing 
chief negotiator for the PACPs,  in a letter13 to the EC’s Director 
General for Trade, Stefano Manservisi, rejected this demand. “We 
will not merely rush to conclude negotiations due to the deadline 
and risk ending up with a bad EPA.” Further he emphasised the 
importance  some  PACPs  attached  to  the  Mode  IV  concession 
(temporary migration) – “If the EPA is silent on this, then we can 
envisage reluctance on their part to be signatories of any EPA.” But 
the make or break issue, from his perspective, was the willingness 
of the EU to enter into a Regional Fisheries Agreement instead of 
bi-lateral  agreements.  He  regarded  it  as  essential  to  have  EU 
political  engagement,  as  technical  discussions  with  EC  officials 
would be unlikely to deliver success.
Article 37.4 Review
Under  Cotonou  a  review  of  the  state  of  the  EPA  negotiations 
needed  to  be  undertaken.   At  a  meeting  of  the  PACP  Trade 
Ministers in November 2006 the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
(PIFS)  was  requested  to  undertake  such  an  assessment.   The 
ECDPM contributed to the internal review (Rampa 2007), with the 
Joint PACP-EC Review Report being included as an Annex in the 
overall  ACP-EU final  Joint  Article  37(4)  Review  adopted  in  May 
2007. 
13 as reported in Islands Business, Suva, 5 Jan 2007
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The ECDPM Report assessed the overall EPA process, unlike 
the  Joint  Review  which  focused  on  the  outstanding  issues  for 
negotiation.  The ECDPM Report identified the capacity limitations 
of the PACP’s in undertaking the negotiations and the particular 
challenges of maintaining negotiating coherence over such a large 
geographical  area.  There  remained,  at  the  time  of  the  review, 
considerable  divergences  within  the  PACP’s  in  regard  to  their 
expectations of an EPA, their position on specific topics and their 
degree of interest in successfully concluding the negotiations. The 
negotiations appeared to be being dominated by the larger PACP’s, 
who were imposing their national priorities. Fiji, in particular, was 
seen as pursuing its overriding objective of defending its interests 
in  the  parallel  Sugar  Protocol  negotiations14.  Not  only  were  the 
smaller state’s governments having difficulty participating but so 
were other stakeholders, including civil society representatives and 
the private sector.  Serious concern was expressed about the lack 
of meaningful consultation and transparency.  There were serious 
doubts  as  to  whether  the  PACP’s  had  the  capacity  and 
preparedness to complete the negotiations by the end of 2007 and 
implement any agreement.
From the beginning there were differences in understanding 
between the PACP’s and the EU, in that the former believed that all 
issues  could  be  raised  and  discussed  informally,  although  not 
formally  negotiated.   By  contrast  the  EC  is  seen  as  regarding 
certain areas as non-negotiable under an EPA.  Further difficulties 
in the negotiation process appeared to the PACPs to have arisen 
from the slowness of response by the EC and the prevalence of 
informal ‘non-papers’ in the discussions.
The  Joint  Review  (PIS  2007)  identified  five  areas  where 
progress was necessary – trade in goods (including RoR), services 
(including  Mode  IV),  investment,  fisheries  and  adjustment 
14 “Fiji’s position on the EPA is going to be dictated on what will happen to the 
sugar negotiations” I. Mataitoga, CEO Foreign Affaire and External Trade (Fiji 
Times 8 Nov 2006)
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assistance. At this stage it was anticipated that between six and 
eleven  PACP’s  might  accede  to  the  separate  Trade  in  Goods 
Agreement.  The EC had offered full  duty-free quota-free access, 
subject  to  certain  transitional  arrangements  for  a  few  sensitive 
products. The PACP’s market access offers emphasised the need for 
transition periods, appropriate exemptions and safeguard clauses. 
Both the EC and the PACP’s intended to foster trade facilitation 
through  addressing  customs  reform,  sanitary  and  phytosanitary 
measures and technical  barriers  to trade.  However  in regard to 
RoO there remained a clear divergence of views. The EC proposed 
to base RoO on value-added,  but  in the case of  the PACP’s  this 
would  have  required  the  uneconomic  import  of  intermediate 
products from the EU or distant ACP regions. Thus, as we have 
seen, the PACP’s had proposed basing RoO on a change of tariff 
subheading at the six digit level. This would allow the PACP’s to 
source intermediate materials from closer low-cost suppliers and 
would be easier to administer15.
In  relation to services  the Joint  Review acknowledges  that 
under  Article  41  of  the  Cotonou  Agreement  the  EPA  is  to 
encompass  the  liberalisation  of  services  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). The PACP’s had indicated a strong preference for adopting 
the  GATS  methodology  in  specifying  commitments.  Again  the 
PACP’s emphasised the importance of Mode IV access to the EC 
labour market for workers in such sectors as construction, health 
care and the maritime industry. While the EC, in a Joint Declaration 
adopted  in  March  2007,  expressed  its  readiness  to  support 
provisions for the cross-border of movement of PACP workers,  it 
again emphasised that temporary worker migration fell within the 
competence  of  the  Member  States.  In  response  to  the  PACPs 
proposals  for  the  reorientation  the  EC’s  financial  and  technical 
support institutions in the region (such as the European Investment 
15 For a detailed discussion of RoO see Alavi (2007) pp38-48.
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Bank and the Centre for the Development of Enterprises) towards 
small medium enterprises, the EC responded that these institutions 
fell within the realm of the overall Cotonou Agreement and that the 
potential  support  for  the  development  of  enterprises  was  best 
discussed  within  the  context  of  the  RPTF.  On  fisheries  the  EC 
acknowledged  the  importance  of  the  industry  for  the  future 
economic  development  of  the  PACPs.   A  detailed  legal  text  had 
been submitted by the PACPs in January 2007 guaranteeing long-
term  access  to  EU  flagged  vessels  to  the  PACP’s  EEZ,  and 
addressing issues such as conservation and the development of the 
industry.  The EC was preparing a reply  at  the time of  the Joint 
Review.
The issue of additional development assistance beyond that 
provided for under the EDFs remained a major bone of contention. 
To emphasise their belief that additional funding will be required, 
not only had the PACP’s failed to establish the RPTF, but they had 
also declined to discuss trade-related issues such as competition 
policies, government procurement, intellectual property rights etc. 
on the grounds that these would be administratively burdensome 
and therefore would require additional development assistance for 
implementation.  From  the  perspective  for  the  PACP’s  EDF 
resources were already earmarked for important regional priorities 
and,  as  the  EPA  will  outlast  the  Cotonou  Agreement,  and  its 
associated  aid  commitments,  it  was  essential  that  an  aid 
component should be directly associated with the EPA. As we have 
seen Smith (2006) estimated that adjustment costs of €184 m. will 
be incurred by the PACP’s in implementing an EPA over a five-year 
period.  The indicative budget  for  the EDF10 Regional  Indicative 
Programme proposed €30 m. for agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 
€40m.  for  education  and  training  and  €6.2  m.  unallocated.  In 
addition there is the possibility of a further 25% enhancement to 
support regional integration and EPA adjustment.  While making no 
commitment  to  additional  resources  the  EC  indicated  it  would 
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support the creation of a regional financial facility to assist  EPA 
adjustment to be funded by EU Member State’s bilateral aid and 
other multilateral donors.
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Interim Partnership Agreement
Negotiations were not improved by the perceived threat by the EC 
to reduce the Pacific EDF10 allocation in the event of failure of the 
EPA discussions. A meeting of the PACP Trade Ministers in August 
expressed  “gave  concern  and  the  disappointment”  at  a 
Communication from the EC, which they interpreted as implying a 
reprogramming of  approximately  48% of  the Regional  Indicative 
Programme in the event of the failure of the EPA negotiations, or of 
26% should a goods-only EPA be negotiated. “Our position remains 
that EDF10 programming and the EPA are separate processes”. In 
response the EC confirmed that the funds would merely be diverted 
from schemes to integrate the regions economies to other projects 
in the same region. “If no EPA is agreed such assistance will be 
reassigned to other jointly  agreed objectives  within the regional 
support  programmes.   The  total  amount  of  support  will  not  be 
reduced  in  any  way.  At  no  time  has  the  EU  used  development 
assistance  as  a  bargaining  chip  in  EPA negotiations.”  (Financial 
Times  August  2007).  However,  implicit  in  this  response  is  the 
threat to reduce the share of the Regional Indicative Programme 
received by those ACPs that do not participate in the EPA.
By October  it  was  clear that  the EC was reconciled to  an 
Interim  Agreement,  signed  by  only  a  limited  number  of  PACP 
states,  being  adopted  by  its  January  2008  deadline  (Joint 
Declaration 2 October). But it was agreed that those PACP states 
that  were not initially party to the Interim Agreement would be 
able to join at any future date upon comparable terms. The Interim 
Agreement was to include a goods schedules, Rules of Origin and 
safeguards  and,  depending upon progress,  fisheries,  competition 
and development cooperation provisions. EC had begun to respond 
positively to PACP proposals on RoO, an ‘infant industry’ clause and 
dispute settlement provisions. The EC also undertook to continue to 
support  the  PACP States  in  their  negotiations  with  the  Member 
States  of  the  EU  to  obtain  Mode  IV  access  through  bilateral 
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Memoranda  of  Understanding.  The  PACP’s,  for  their  part,  had 
finally  established  a  RPTF,  and  the  EC  confirmed  that  human 
resource development would be an important part of EDF10. 
Ten PACP’s had submitted their goods market access offers in 
late September 2007, but after intensive negotiations, culminating 
in a Joint Ministerial meeting on November 14, it was clear that 
there were too many technical issues remaining to be resolved by 
the  end  of  the  year.  The  EC  therefore  resolved  “to  secure  the 
position of those countries that account for the majority of trade 
with  the  EU  and  who  have  submitted  WTO-compatible  market 
access offers” (Mandelson 20 November). Thus only Fiji and PNG 
signed a Trade in Goods Agreement on the 29 th November. The 
market access provisions of the Interim Agreement are to continue 
in force until a full EPA is agreed.
Both  Fiji  and  PNG  are  particularly  dependent  upon 
maintaining market access to the EU for their exports of sugar and 
tuna  respectively.  For  Fiji,  sugar  exports  are  worth  €95  m.  per 
annum and, although their sugar allocation had been suspended for 
2007 in response to the coup, it was expected to be resumed in 
2008. A replacement for the Sugar Protocol was also required from 
October 2009 if Fiji was to maintain access to the EU market. In 
April 2007 the EU had tabled a market access offer for sugar as 
part  of  any  EPA,  with  the  continuation  of  current  ACP  access 
provisions  until  2009  and  movement  to  a  quota  and  tariff  free 
market  for  ACP  sugar  by  2015.   Thus  by  signing  the  Interim 
Agreement Fiji guaranteed its existing preferences and acquired an 
opportunity to further expand its exports in the longer term. For 
PNG tuna exports are worth €40m. per annum and PNGs required 
continued duty-free access to the EU to maintain its competitive 
advantage over Thailand and the Philippines. The EPA also offered 
concessions  on  the  Rules  of  Origin;  thus  as  long  as  fish  are 
processed onshore in the PACP the nationality of the ownership of 
the vessel and crew will no longer be relevant. 
30
In terms of tariff liberalisation the Agreement requires PNG 
to offer duty-free access for 88% of the value of its imports from 
the EU.  As 76% of its tariffs are already duty-free this commitment 
involves  very  little  cost  in  duty  foregone  and  will  occur 
immediately.  For Fiji a phased reduction in duties on EU imports 
will take place over 15 years and will cover 81.6% of EU imports. 
On the entry into force of the Agreement only 23% of EU imports 
will be duty-free. The largest reduction in duties, 40%, will occur in 
years 6 to 10. The remaining aspects of the agreement are similar 
to  those  concluded  in  other  interim  EPAs.   These  include  the 
provision  for  a  review  of  the  Rules  of  Origin  after  five  years, 
clauses  covering  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures  and 
Technical  Barriers  to  Trade,  provisions  covering  anti-dumping, 
countervailing  measures  and  safeguards,  as  well  as  for  infant 
industry  protection,  a  prohibition  on  new  export  taxes  and  a 
standstill provision preventing new or increased duties. 
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Conclusion
The  EPA  provides  for  the  extension  of  the  Interim  Agreement 
preferences  to  any  other  PACP signatory  with  a  commitment  to 
conclude  a  comprehensive  EPA  “in-line  with  the  Cotonou 
Agreement and previous ministerial declarations and conclusions” 
by  the  end  of  2008.  But  as  the  EU  has  shown  considerable 
reluctance  to  concede  in  other  areas  of  interest  to  the  PACP’s, 
particularly  the  employment  of  PACP nationals  in  EU territories 
(Mode IV), it is not clear how motivated the other PACP states will 
be  to  arrive  at  a  more  comprehensive  agreement.  More 
problematically  the  Interim  Agreement  also  introduces  a  non-
discrimination most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause.  Thus it  would 
require any additional concessions offered to Australia  and New 
Zealand, arising for example from the renegotiation of PACER, to 
be  extended  to  the  EU.  More  significantly  for  the  PACP’s  the 
Interim  Agreement  will  almost  certainly  trigger  such  a 
renegotiation. Thus the provisions of the EPA have the potential to 
undermine the region’s own trade integration initiatives, including 
the MSG, especially if other PACPs accede to the Agreement.
Further no additional funds have been allocated to meet the 
needs of EPA adjustment.  However the EU’s new Strategy on Aid 
for Trade16 might offer some assistance.  The EU committed itself 
to increasing trade related assistance (TRA) from the current €1 
bn.  per  annum  to  €2  bn.  by  2010.  The  cost  of  this  additional 
assistance  will  be  borne equally  by  the Member  States  and the 
European Commission. Since the European Commission is already 
allocating €1 bn. to TRA most of the additional funding will have to 
be  provided  from  Member  States’  aid  budgets.  This  raises  an 
element of  uncertainty,  as  does the ability  of  the EU to achieve 
policy coherence in this area; ensuring coordination, harmonisation 
and alignment. The strategy is also intended to be ‘demand-driven’ 
and  therefore  requires  potential  recipients  to  be  proactive  in 
16 EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: enhancing EU support for trade related needs in 
developing countries, October 2007.
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identifying presenting qualifying proposals. It should also be noted 
that the TRA funds are available to all  developing countries, not 
just the ACP group.
Although the low-income PACP states17 will retain duty-free 
access under the EBA, this does not offer the same Rules of Origin 
advantages as the EPA. But it still remains questionable whether 
the  remaining  PACPs,  other  than  PNG  and  Fiji,  will  have  the 
motivation to subscribe to either the Interim or a Final Agreement. 
There of course remains the question of whether the EU, faced with 
the rejection of  EPAs across a large number of  ACP states,  will 
finally  address  the  issue  of  an  alternative.  For  from  the 
commencement of negotiations many commentators have argued 
that  the  EU  is  required  to  offer  an  alternative,  other  than  the 
current General System of Preferences enjoyed by all developing 
countries, if it is to meet its commitments under Cotonou. 
17 Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu
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